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Abstract 
 
Science diplomacy recently has gained a remarkable foothold in European policymaking. Both 
the European Commission and many Member States use the term to label a whole range of 
issues and activities in their respective policies. This prompts the question what exactly is the 
current role of the European Commission in the field of external research policies as compared 
to the Member States traditionally in charge of it. The article draws on the conceptual frame-
work of multi-level governance, in particular the distinction between Type I and Type II gov-
ernance systems. The aim is to show that the well-established setups for science policy and 
foreign affairs in the EU at present channel most of the Commission's activities in ways that 
not run counter to the interests of the Member States. The institutionally set parameters entail a 
focus on existing programs and activities. However, the Type II character of science diplomacy 
governance in principle leaves room for changes in jurisdictions and the division of labor, 
which are subsequently discussed. The paper’s argument rests upon the qualitative analysis of 
expert interviews conducted with representatives from Member States, the Commission, Swit-
zerland, and the US. 
Keywords: science diplomacy, foreign policy, science policy, international relations, multi-
level governance 
1. Introduction 
 
The term “science diplomacy” (SD) has undergone a stellar career around the world and has 
gained a foothold in European policymaking during the last decade as well. The advocates of 
the concept claim that SD innovatively links foreign policy and science and technology (S&T) 
policy, builds bridges between hitherto separate communities of experts, converts existing di-
visions of labor between actors and policy areas, and thus has a genuinely transformative char-
acter (Lord and Turekian, 2007). However, it has not been sufficiently clarified what different 
policy actors mean by the term and whether it actually changes established setups in interna-
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tional affairs and S&T policy. To close these gaps, this paper addresses these questions using 
the case of SD in the European Union. 
The European Commission (EC) and several Member States have adopted the term in running 
their foreign affairs and external science policy. In 2016, EU-Commissioner Carlos Moedas 
called for SD to become a priority for the policies of the Commission (Moedas, 2016). Wheth-
er this means, however, that Member States and the Commission have a similar understanding 
of SD and whether it follows from this that the activities of both sides overlap, compete, or 
complement each other is not yet clear. It is not a foregone conclusion that the different Euro-
pean players foster a concerted approach of “EU science diplomacy”. In fact, we currently 
know little about the interactions between Member States’ interests and activities and that of 
the EC. There are studies on different national approaches to SD (Flink and Schreiterer, 2010) 
and on the Commission’s very recent take on international science policymaking (López de 
San Román and Schunz, 2018; Prange-Gstöhl, 2018). Yet so far, little attention has been paid 
to the relations between both. In the past, the EC has repeatedly called for closer collaboration 
between the European level and the Member States in foreign relations and external science 
and research policy (European Commission, 2014, 2012, 2008; European Union, 2016). A 
glance at some of the relevant strategic documents of larger Member States, however, shows 
that little to no attention has been paid to the role of cooperation with the Commission in SD-
related issues beyond collaboration in established policy initiatives like the European Research 
Area (ERA) (e.g. BMBF Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2016; HM Treasury & 
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, 2014; MAEA Ministry for Europe and Foreign 
Affairs, 2013). Up until now, it is an open question which understandings of SD prevail–and 
subsequently which place SD seizes–within the institutional framework of contemporary Eu-
ropean multi-level governance (MLG). SD may well serve as a boundary object, which actors 
use to justify, stabilize or even expand their own competences, be it in alignment with, or at the 
expense of, other actors. 
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The article addresses these questions by analyzing the EC’s current agendas and activities in 
this emerging field in comparison to those of the Member States. In particular, it looks into 
how the different actors appraise each other’s activities and aims at identifying patterns of col-
laboration or competition. More fundamentally, it draws on the perspective of MLG scholar-
ship as an appropriate tool to understand and account for the interplay of the different actors in 
the area of SD. Subsequently, it investigates whether SD infuses any potential for change in 
the current setting of European MLG. Moreover, it sheds light on what the different actors are 
thinking about such a potential, and whether such a change—in particular a shift in authority 
from the Member States’ administrations to the European level—may even already be under 
way. The article relies on empirical data from expert interviews with representatives of nation-
al public administrations and research organizations from the Member States as well as from 
the Commission. 
The paper is organized as follows: First, it provides a short overview of the activities labeled as 
SD in several European states, highlighting their major characteristics at the nexus of science 
policy and foreign affairs. Second, it introduces the MLG perspective as suitable framework 
for the analysis and describes the setup of European policymaking in both policy fields against 
the backdrop of this theoretical approach. Third, it presents the findings from the interviews 
that illustrate the status-quo of European SD on the levels of strategic planning, program im-
plementation, and operations. Finally, the paper discusses theoretical implications and conse-
quences for policymaking of the current state of affairs in the field of European SD. 
2. The emergence of science diplomacy 
 
SD is a recent term that was initially coined, and subsequently more systematically used, in the 
United States. It came up during the late 1990s after expert reports had recommended to better 
integrate science-related expertise into the US State Department’s policies (Lord and Turekian, 
2007; National Research Council, 1999). 
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Around 2005, the term became increasingly popular, both as a catch-all phrase and as a pana-
cea concept for a country’s or an organization’s external engagement in S&T, for international 
activities to tackle global challenges, and finally to foster soft power capacities. At the same 
time, SD has been understood to nurture bi- and multilateral relations, buttress national innova-
tion systems, and contribute to economic growth (Copeland, 2016). In 2010, the British Royal 
Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science jointly published a 
seminal report that highlighted three different elements of SD (Royal Society, 2010): science 
in diplomacy refers to scientific advice in general and science-based counsel to foreign services 
in particular. Diplomacy for science embraces foreign policy activities that aim at facilitating 
international scientific collaboration, the exchange of researchers, and the promotion of domes-
tic innovations. Finally, science for diplomacy characterizes collaborative scientific activities 
that may help foster inter-state relations. 
However, it is important to note the difference between the deliberate use of the label SD—
which is a phenomenon of the recent past—and activities which would qualify as SD but are 
older. Examples for the latter are the Track II diplomacy initiatives at the European Organiza-
tion for Nuclear Research CERN (Müller and Bona, 2018; Schopper, 2009) or policies pursued 
by the US administration in the 1970s (Turekian, 2018). 
The explicit use of the label SD has proliferated among the Member States of the EU for at 
least the last decade. Several countries, for instance, the UK, France, and Germany were 
among the first worldwide to engage the concept of SD by establishing science and innovation 
networks, setting up outposts for national S&T overseas, and dispatching S&T counsellors 
abroad (Flink and Schreiterer, 2010). The Commission participated in the discourse on the in-
ternational dimension of the European S&T sector but has only started to use the term “science 
diplomacy” more recently. When Carlos Moedas became Commissioner for Research, Science 
and Innovation in 2014, he stressed its importance and potential benefits for Europe. In par-
ticular, he referred to the soft power of S&T for improving the EU’s external relations 
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(Moedas, 2016). Still, a better integration of science into the EC’s foreign policy agenda is 
mentioned in the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy (Eu-
ropean Union, 2016) only en passant. 
Other incumbents of the field include intermediary, partially autonomous organizations like the 
already mentioned Royal Society, national research funding bodies like the British Research 
Councils1 or the German Research Foundation (DFG), international organizations such as 
UNESCO, or transnational academic associations like the International Council for Science 
(ICSU).These different actors have begun to use the term SD to varying degrees in order to (re-
)label their ongoing operations or to develop new activities attached to it. 
From this brief and non-exhaustive overview it already becomes clear that SD in Europe is a 
very diverse and highly fragmented policy area that stretches across multiple levels. SD as a 
label is not unambiguous, but rather fuzzy and, depending on the user, can have a whole range 
of meanings. It seems plausible to assume that SD thus becomes part of the boundary work 
(Gieryn, 1983) of different communities and actors who strive to interpret the term in their 
own interest. Yet these floating interpretations of the term are insufficiently captured by the 
Royal Society's threefold definition. The paper does not propose a definition of its own. In-
stead, it aims to determine what individual actors considered as belonging to this policy area. 
Following this empirically based approach, tensions, conflicts, but also opportunities for coop-
eration between actors then arise from understandings of SD that are either shared by or heter-
ogeneous among actors. How can we characterize, and make sense of, the relation between the 
Member States’ policies and that of the EC aside from announcement in policy documents?  
3. Approaching science diplomacy via the multi-level governance perspective 
 
                                                     
1 These institutions were merged to UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) in 2018. 
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To answer this question, we have to take into account the institutional framework which 
shapes the interactions of the Commission and the Member States in the fields of foreign af-
fairs and science policy (Prange-Gstöhl, 2018). 
 
3.1 The multi-level governance framework 
The MLG approach serves as the conceptual starting point for this undertaking. By turning to 
this framework, we can analyze the complex interplay between the different incumbents of the 
field and answer the question whether there is any functioning type of de facto SD governance 
arrangement in Europe.  
MLG originally developed as part of the study of European integration. In a nutshell, it postu-
lated a decentralization of competencies, a shift of jurisdictional powers away from the Mem-
ber States’ administrations, and put the spotlight on the supranational and subnational level of 
European policymaking (Marks, 1993; Marks et al., 1996). The approach has attracted a tre-
mendous amount of attention and has inspired numerous European integration studies (for an 
overview see Piattoni, 2009; Stephenson, 2013; Zürn et al., 2010). The actor-centered MLG 
framework moves beyond simplistic conceptualizations of principal-agent relations between 
the Member States and the European institutions. In this view, political authority resides not 
only at the level of national governments but also at subnational (federal) institutions as well as 
European bodies, in particular the Commission and the European Parliament. This is not to say 
that European nation-states are replaced by a supranational entity or a conglomerate of regions. 
Rather, leading scholars of MLG recognize the continuing authority of Member States but 
place a stronger focus on the interaction of regions, the Commission, and nation-states 
(Schakel et al., 2015). In sum, European policymaking is more pluralistic, networked and 
complex than purely state-centered approaches assume. Hence, processes of integration do not 
follow a general logic but take place to varying degrees in specific policy areas. The MLG ap-
proach has proven useful to analyze various European policy areas, including foreign affairs 
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(Smith, 2004; Webber et al., 2004) and S&T policy (Kaiser and Prange, 2004). We know from 
these and others analyses that science and foreign policies have developed separately for the 
most part in the course of European integration (see also Börzel, 2005; Marks et al., 1996). 
With regard to different policy areas, the distinction between Type I and Type II governance 
systems put forward by Marks and Hooghe (2003; 2004) is of particular importance for the 
present paper. They distinguish relatively stable governance systems with clearly defined re-
sponsibilities and jurisdictions—so-called Type I systems—from more flexible Type II con-
stellations in which jurisdictions overlap and are much more in flux. As I will argue in the fol-
lowing paragraphs, it is appropriate to consider science policy and foreign affairs as mostly 
separate Type I policy areas while SD is located at the ill-defined juncture of both fields, thus 
establishing an area of Type II governance. 
3.2 The institutional setup for science diplomacy in Europe 
While it is considered to be part of “the external engagement of the EU in science and research 
policy” (Prange-Gstöhl, 2018, p. 160), SD also relates to the areas of international relations 
and ‘high’ politics, such as security policy (Edler and James, 2015; López de San Román and 
Schunz, 2018). It is therefore important to briefly describe the MLG governance settings in 
these traditional areas insofar as they affect, or even determine, policymaking that relates to 
SD.  
Policy coordination in the EU (and previously, the European Communities) has always shifted 
between different and often competing polity-ideas (see, for instance, Edler, 2010; Jachten-
fuchs et al., 1998; Papon, 2009), ranging from a strong integration on a supranational level to 
purely intergovernmental approaches. S&T policy and foreign policy are no exception to this 
rule and, thus, have seen different phases of policy coordination that can be characterized by 
differences in the division of labor and jurisdictional powers ascribed to the European institu-
tions (e.g. European Commission, European Parliament, European Court of Justice) on the one 
hand, and the Member States on the other. 
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In science policy, initial examples of collaboration, such as CERN, rest on intergovernmental 
agreements. It was not until the early 1980s that the Commission attempted to gain a foothold 
in research and development (R&D) policy when the first technology-push funding programs 
in areas of ICT and new materials triggered the new Framework Programmes (FP) (Stein, 
2002). Eventually, the Commission managed to increase its influence, and to extend both its 
responsibilities and resources in matters of S&T policy. Starting with FP6 in 2002, the Com-
mission brought about several important changes, including a major financial boost for FP7, 
the launch of the European Research Council (ERC), several new coordination mechanisms 
under the auspices of the European Research Area (ERA), the roadmapping for large scientific 
infrastructures, joint programming, and policy coordination. The primary rationale of the FPs 
and the Commission’s research policy in general was—and arguably still is—to strengthen 
Europe’s competitiveness against other states or world regions, in particular, the US, Japan 
and, more recently, the BRICS. 
Still, and in spite of the significant expansion of its activities, the Commission has at no time 
gained exclusive authority over the Member States’ national science policies and programs. 
Instead, rights and obligations of all involved actors derive from legally enshrined agreements 
and well-established procedures. This already indicates that—from the MLG perspective—
S&T is a Type I-dominated policy area. Organizing and funding of research remain core juris-
dictional competencies of the Member States. This applies to all dimensions of external en-
gagement in science and research as well. The EC’s activities in this area cannot simply forgo 
the institutional framework of shared responsibilities between itself and the Member States. 
Instead, they have to adjust accordingly, first and foremost by demonstrating complementarity 
or added value. In a nutshell, the Commission has limited leverage to push its agenda in major 
fields of science policy without first consulting with the Council and the European Parliament, 
for instance, in the ordinary legislative procedure (formerly co-decision) preceding the start of 
new FPs. 
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The EU’s foreign policy, on the other hand, represents a MLG system in its own rights. Similar 
to S&T policy, it has undergone several steps of integration that came often along with particu-
lar treaties (Smith, 2016, 2004; Wong and Hill, 2011). Over a period of almost 40 years, we 
have seen a whole catalog of political initiatives to nudge Member States to better coordinate 
their external affairs, starting with the now famous Davignon-report on the future of a joint 
foreign policy of the European Economic Community from 1970 (European Communities, 
1970). That report paved the way for the instrument of European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
which in 1986 became institutionalized in the Single European Act (SEA). Less than ten years 
later, the Member States agreed on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as one of 
three pillars in the Treaty of Maastricht taking effect in 1993. In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon 
marked the most recent critical juncture for the EU’s foreign policy (Laursen, 2014). Recog-
nizing the need for a stronger and more visible foreign policy, a new service department came 
into being: the European External Action Service (EEAS). The hybrid structure of the EEAS, 
is “one of the most important foreign policy inventions in Europe to date” (Adler-Nissen, 
2014, p. 2) and neatly illustrates the complexity of the policy field. Most of the EEAS’s staff is 
temporarily assigned from national foreign ministries, while some officers are recruited from 
the Commission’s administration, creating an “interstitial organization” between the Commis-
sion and the Council (Bátora, 2013). 
In terms of the MLG-perspective, foreign affairs represent another Type I-dominated policy 
area in that all actors must adhere to the intricate framework of treaties that define their respec-
tive roles in this particular MLG-setting. De facto, as in the case of S&T, it is a field in which 
Member States retain enormous powers which they do not transfer to the Commission as a 
supranational entity. Neither does the EEAS’s head, the High Representative for Foreign Af-
fairs and Security Policy, act as an EU’s minister or Commissioner for foreign affairs, nor does 
the service replace, supersede, or dominate national foreign offices and services. In matters of 
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‘high politics’, Member States maintain a key position in decision-making, meaning that Euro-
pean diplomacy may only attend to topics of lesser importance or delicacy (Smith, 2016). 
In sum, science policy and foreign affairs constitute two jurisdictional areas that lean towards 
Mark’s and Hooghe’s ideal Type I of MLG. They are characterized by a rather clear-cut, often 
legally enshrined division of competencies and a finite number of actors and levels.  
Turning to what we have come to call SD, we find that the activities linked to this label reside 
at the intersection of both policy areas. SD as a newly emerging area or polity does not (yet) fit 
into the scheme of clearly delineated, legally defined, jurisdictions. Based on the theoretical 
notions of Marks and Hooghe (2003; 2004), it is more appropriate to conceptualize SD as a 
Type II MLG system, that is “a complex, fluid patchwork of innumerable, overlapping and 
functionally specialized jurisdictions” (Zürn et al., 2010, p. 4). Policies concerning SD might 
touch upon innumerable jurisdictions—basically including all communities who are keen to 
use the term for their own purposes—but the MLG perspective helps to identify the crucial 
levels and to maintain oversight of the actors and their relations. It then becomes an empirical 
question how this fluctuating space is filled by the activities of established incumbents from 
science policy and foreign affairs from the EC, the Member States’ administrations, subordi-
nate agencies, and non-governmental organizations. In other words, how does SD fit into the 
picture of overlapping jurisdictions and competing actors? 
4. Methodological considerations, data and analytical approach 
 
To examine this question, 45 semi-structured, guideline-based expert interviews were conduct-
ed. The selection strategy was meant to cover the different actors and levels of SD, in particu-
lar well-established incumbents of the field known from previous research (Flink and 
Schreiterer, 2010). Furthermore, interviews from a smaller Member State (Denmark) were 
added to the sample to provide a contrastive and more differentiated picture of SD in Europe. 
Based on these specifications, interviews with 32 representatives from four Member States 
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(FR: 7; DE: 16; DK: 3; UK: 6) and six representatives from the EC were conducted. These 
officials were concerned with, or in charge of, formulating and managing the international ac-
tivities of their respective organizations. Therefore, they were considered ex officio experts for 
the topic of SD in the widest sense of the term to the extent that they were capable of describ-
ing and illuminating their organization’s position towards the topic and with regard to the other 
actors in the field. In the interviews, however, no explicit definition (e.g. the Royal Society’s) 
was prescribed. Instead the actors were invited to employ their own understanding of SD. 
Thus, their statements were part of specific attempts to define demarcations and jurisdictional 
claims, which in turn helped to reconstruct the frame of reference for SD in the system of Eu-
ropean governance. 
The interviewees’ expertise did not exclusively stem from personal experience in directly con-
ducting SD-related activities but also from tasks like, for instance, supervising the respective 
actions or from drafting relevant documents and managing and monitoring the strategic plan-
ning procedures.2 The selection aimed at covering a wide set of actors in the respective nation-
al systems for the governance of foreign affairs and S&T. In consequence, the interviewees 
were members of ministries responsible for foreign affairs or research respectively, S&T coun-
selors at embassies, or representatives from funding agencies or research organizations.3 The 
EC’s officers belonged to the EEAS, the Directorate General Research and Innovation (DG 
RTD), or the Joint Research Centre (JRC).  
To complement the intra-EU perspective, another four interviews were conducted with mem-
bers of US research institutions and funding agencies, and three with officials from Switzer-
land. The interviews took place between January 2017 and May 2018. 41 interviews were au-
                                                     
2 The underlying understanding of “expertise” seems necessary to sufficiently cover the width of SD 
related activities.  
3 The interview partners were assured that they would remain anonymous. Therefore, an exact break-
down of functions and organizations cannot be provided. 
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dio-recorded and transcribed; the other four were extensively documented with notes. Inter-
views that were not conducted in English were translated afterwards. 
The guidelines were developed against the backdrop of Mayring’s methodology for qualitative 
content analysis (Mayring, 2014, 2000). Following a deductive approach, the basic categories 
of analysis were derived from the MLG perspective. In order to ensure a fine-grained descrip-
tion of the current system of SD governance, the guidelines consisted of questions on the indi-
vidual organizational SD strategies, agendas, and activities. The categories encompassed the 
mutual perception of the actors from the Member States and the EC respectively (e.g. positive 
or negative appraisal). Building on this framework, additional categories were inductively de-
veloped based on the interview data by clustering the different statements into three levels of 
engagement. The first is concerned with strategic planning and decision-making, the second 
deals with programs, and the last aggregates operational activities on the ground. This heuristic 
division runs transverse to the categories of actor relationships and helps to make sense of their 
SD related activities analytically.  
5. The relations between the Member States and Commission 
 
First of all, the data confirms that the MLG framework provides a suitable approach for the 
analysis close to the actors’ own perspectives. Very much in line with insights from the litera-
ture, the interviewees’ statements show that they themselves conceptualize European govern-
ance against the background of multi-level considerations (Stephenson, 2013), and consequent-
ly structure their activities and perceptions along the lines of these established demarcations 
and boundaries. The interview partners were aware of the different options for organizing SD 
in the complex European policy environment, be it jointly at the supranational level, bi- or 
multilaterally among the Member States or independently on the national level: 
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“Are we talking about [a] European level science diplomacy or Member States’ sci-
ence diplomacy or both? Are we talking about [SD, author’s note] at regional level, at 
national level, at institutional level or even individual level?” [EC-2]4 
 
“So, with us, there is a bit of dualism between doing something in Brussels, or doing 
something bilaterally.” [DE-2] 
 
In order to understand the intricate interplay of options adequately, the analysis employs the 
heuristic categories of strategic planning, program activities, and operations on the micro-level. 
These categories also reflect to some extent the classifications the interview partners used in 
the interviews as part of their boundary work. 
5.1 Strategic planning and decision-making 
 
The level of strategic planning and decision-making sets the stage for conflicts and disagree-
ments over the architecture of jurisdictions and authority. Here, the lasting effects of the poli-
cies of European integration, as outlined in section 3, shape the jurisdictional views and expec-
tation of the Member States and the EC.  
Quarrels and tensions at this level deal with the substance of the institutionalized Type I gov-
ernance systems and address and challenge established divisions of labor both in functional 
terms (i.e. between science and foreign policy) and with regard to the actors involved. Most 
prominently, they manifest in discords over jurisdiction between the Commission and the 
Member States that mirror conflict lines between national interests and the EC’s agenda. The 
interview partners from the Member States’ administrations, regardless of their nationality, 
took a firm stand against a leading role of the Commission in SD and all claims coming along 
with that: 
“The EU always tries to take possession of things, that’s only natural and I generally 
have no objections to that. But there are some Member States, including my own that 
would ask: does it do any good if the EU takes control over something that is our genu-
ine topic?” [DE-12] 
                                                     
4 This and the following quotations are meant to illustrate the findings of the analysis and to highlight 
particularly important insights. All quotations were slightly language edited for improved readability.  
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They outright rejected scenarios according to which the Commission would coordinate nation-
al SD activities in a supranational manner, drawing on two arguments: First, the interviewees, 
as part of their boundary work, referred to the EU treaties and the legal documents that codify 
rights and obligations for the Member States and the EC respectively. For all of them, the ra-
tionale of added value served as a key point of reference. SD activities of the Commission, in 
this view, would have to complement national endeavors, be it in negotiations with third coun-
tries or in intra-European bargaining over science funding and joint European research initia-
tives. 
Even within the Commission, strategic considerations were based on providing added value to 
national efforts: 
“But then of course we also struggle among Europeans, now I’m not talking only about 
EU institutions, to identify the correct added value of the EU vis-à-vis national initia-
tive and so to operate as a single effective team.” [EC-3] 
 
Regardless of the specific interpretation of added value, it became clear that even if the EC 
succeeded to make such an argument, it would be a difficult battle to gain a foothold in strate-
gic SD initiatives. The quotes illustrate the legal framework that constitutes the rather well-
defined division of labor in the areas of foreign affairs and science policy in the EU and acts as 
a cognitive guideline for the involved actors.  
Second, it was a reoccurring topic in the interviews that an excessive engagement of the Com-
mission in SD would not only violate established jurisdictional arrangements but would also 
diminish efficiency. National authorities could implement, fund, and monitor their SD activi-
ties without having to coordinate with another 27 players. These arguments notwithstanding, 
all interviewees highly appreciated intergovernmental—meaning inter-state, horizontal—
coordination between the EU Member States, depending, of course, on topics, but also on the 
respective strengths and weaknesses of the partners involved. Yet they all were adamant that it 
should remain the prerogative of Member States to launch such collaborative initiatives and 
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venues. In the multi-level governance setting of the EU, strategic actions should, in this view, 
primarily originate bottom-up from the Member States but not top-down from the EC.  
It is noteworthy though that not a single representative from the different organizations did 
entirely reject a strategic role for EC in SD. Interviewees from funding agencies, research or-
ganizations, and from national administrations all stressed their great interests to remain in 
good standing, or at least in coming to terms with the EC. Across the board, the interview part-
ners from the Member States acknowledged the agency of the Commission as long as it 
matched the well-established, carefully balanced procedures in the areas of foreign affairs and 
S&T policy. Overall, the general attitude of the interview partners was geared towards continu-
ity. A shift in authority from the Member States to the EC was not demanded and contestation 
of the current system of governance remained weak. 
The interviews with Swiss and US-American researchers and government officials supported 
this finding. Aside from PR to promote the Union’s program activities, they rarely regarded the 
Commission as a strategic actor in the field of SD. Instead, they were more familiar with na-
tional and organizational strategies, in particular, those of the Member States with strong sci-
ence sectors and extensive funding capabilities. Acknowledging these institutional and factual 
constraints could be the reason why one officer from the Commission frankly stated “We don’t 
have a specific strategy for science diplomacy. It would exaggerate our attitude if I would 
characterize it in these terms.” [EC-3] Instead, Commission staff indicated that they would 
explore the potential of SD within the framework of existing treaties and responsibilities which 
brings us to the level of programmatic activities. 
5.2 The program level 
 
Turning from the level of agenda-setting and strategic planning to the better-defined level of 
policy initiatives and programs, we find that the Commission is not a simple agent of Member 
States’ interests but possesses some degrees of freedom to engage in SD. There, the analysis 
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found much more openness and commonly accepted opportunities for the Commission to take 
an active or even a leading role. This is very much in line with insights from general MLG-
scholarship that stress both the relevance of actors beyond the nation state and the shifts in 
authority towards these entities as long as these degrees of freedom in policymaking derive 
from well-established jurisdictional demarcations in specific policy areas. 
For instance, once a FP has passed the legislative process, the Commission has some leeway to 
initiate project calls tailored to issues of SD. Other examples brought up by the interviewees 
are initiatives like the ERA which entail a great many supporting activities like the ERA-NETs 
or joint programming initiatives5, explicitly designed to bring together national and regional 
funding agencies and ministries to collaborate and horizontally coordinate S&T activities (and 
policies) within the EU.  
The same rationale applies to the association agreements to Horizon 2020 that quite a few non-
EU countries have signed or the 20 Science and Technology Agreements (STAs) concluded by 
the Commission on behalf of the Member States. Carlos Moedas, for instance, traveled to Kiev 
in March 2015, to sign an association agreement that allowed the Ukraine to take part in Hori-
zon 2020. It became “the first EU programme in which Ukraine has chosen to participate fol-
lowing the beginning of provisional application of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement” 
(European Commission, 2015). Of course, that may have been an exception. Nevertheless, the 
event demonstrated the opportunities of using Horizon 2020 for promoting science for diplo-
macy. The Commission’s support for scientific collaboration in the Western Balkan region 
may follow a similar rationale. At the bottom line, S&T add another layer of symbolic interac-
tion to the diplomatic toolbox: 
“[…] since we also support external policies, including the European neighborhood 
policy, there is an interest for us not only to associate those countries that have excel-
lent science and technology capacities but also those that we want to be part of the Eu-
                                                     
5 See https://www.era-learn.eu/p2p-in-a-nutshell/type-of-networks/joint-programming-initiatives, ac-
cessed 31 October 2018. 
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ropean project in terms of integrating them into the European Research Area. And by 
integrating them into such an area, you create stability, you create links, and so it’s 
science diplomacy…” [EC-3] 
 
Here, SD is not framed as a policy field on its own but rather considered to be an instrument in 
the toolbox of foreign policy thus taking its place in an already established Type I governance 
system. Officials from the EC try to enlist SD, for instance, in the context of European Neigh-
bourhood Policy (ENP), or in the EEAS’s Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) framework. How-
ever, all these uses of SD occur on an ad-hoc basis only, for instance, when reaching out to 
countries in the Mediterranean or in the Eastern Partnerships. Moreover, all these instruments 
carry a rather small budget compared to the dimensions of funds that DG RTD commands for 
its programs.  
Regardless of their respective resources, the Member States tolerate or even approve of such 
motions of the Commission as long as they are consistent with well-kept institutional bounda-
ries. The program level provides the EC with something like a legitimate ticket to go for the 
integration of SD instruments since this does not challenge the setup of European MLG. Con-
sequently, Member States and EC work side by side without strong interaction, coordination, 
or fierce competition. Nevertheless, both sides monitor each other’s activities. 
The Commission’s SD is by no means the only approach to trans- and supranational S&T poli-
cies in Europe. For historical reasons, the Member States are free in the choice of their policies 
in SD and pursue their objectives in various forms (see also Flink and Schreiterer, 2010). Some 
of them collaborate closely on several occasions and topics, thus adding another layer to the 
MLG system of European SD. Intergovernmental research organizations like CERN, the Euro-
pean Space Agency ESA, or the funding initiative EUREKA have been at the core of transna-
tional research collaboration in Europe for a long time (Papon, 2004). While the EC has turned 
into a partner in many of these endeavors, the Member States continue to guard their national 
interests against any possible infringement from the side of the Commission. This, of course, 
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does not prevent the EC from taking the most credit for these European success stories (e.g., 
Moedas, 2016). In other areas, countries or individual organizations may pool their resources 
on a bi- or multilateral basis without consulting the other Member States’ governments or the 
Commission. One rationale for this pragmatic approach to SD is that Member States “try to 
organize things at the European level as well” [FR-5] primarily if they expect a positive return 
on their respective investment. Larger countries are well aware of the fact that they “can en-
force their own interests” [DE-3]. Hence, they can afford to assign horizontal intergovernmen-
tal collaboration and cooperation with the EC basically at the same level of importance, as one 
interviewee frankly put it: 
“Sometimes, doing things together can open doors. Whether it’s just me with my Ger-
man colleague or whether it’s me with the EU delegation and the Swedish and the 
Spanish, it opens the same doors. So we could do it just two or three countries without 
the EU” [FR-5]. 
 
On the other hand, some interviewees emphasized the advantages of joint activities as “there is 
a danger that all Member States establish something like this [S&T network outposts, author’s 
note] in the same region” [DK-3]. The Commission’s role—according to an interview partner 
from Denmark—then was to act as a kind of representative of those Member States that are 
“not […] so well represented in some of the new emerging markets or new research and inno-
vation hotspots around the world. Of course, they would have a stronger interest in doing 
something common and under the umbrella of the EU” [DK-1]. Activities like the conclusion 
of Science and Technology Agreements (STA) or the international promotion of the FPs came 
up as examples that could facilitate external S&T activities from (smaller) Member States 
which otherwise would not stand a chance to participate in SD with much larger third coun-
tries. 
The views from Switzerland and the US back the hypothesis that the Commission has some 
leverage on the program level. For instance, participation in the FPs is a top priority for science 
policy in Switzerland. The same is true for the US. US institutions and the Commission have 
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put a lot of effort into eliminating bureaucratic barriers for US scientists to participate in Hori-
zon 2020. The example of the negotiations between the EU and Switzerland on matters of mi-
gration is just another case in point where science became a “coercive measure to enforce 
compliance with broader issues of European Politics” (Leese, 2018, p. 51). This example also 
illustrates the potential power that the EU can harness vis-à-vis third countries if all Member 
States and the Commission develop joint positions in SD-related negotiations. 
5.3 The operational level 
 
When it comes to the level of individual action, the shackles of the institutionalized govern-
ance system are turning ever more elastic, thus illustrating the fluid characteristics of a Type II 
governance system. In the analysis, particular attention was paid to those activities that the 
Member States and the Commission engage in abroad. Empirically, both parties are pursuing 
these activities side by side. The Commission, for instance, maintains a network of S&T coun-
selors with the EU-delegations in several non-member countries. The EEAS is responsible for 
these delegations, including S&T counselors. However, S&T staff is usually dispatched from 
and paid by DG RTD. Both the Commission and the Member States maintain offices in hot-
beds of innovation and fundamental research such as China, India, or Brazil.  
Hence, the prevalent modus operandi of the different European actors very much depends on 
individual interactions, that is, their handling of different issues on the ground. On the opera-
tional level, the scope of activities of the EC on the one hand and of the Member States on the 
other differs widely. S&T counselors from the Member States more often than not have to 
manage a well-defined set of tasks: monitoring developments in R&D on-site, providing guid-
ance for delegations from their home country, initiating new collaborative projects, and some-
times acting as a liaison office for local administrations. Documents signed off by govern-
ments, such as the German High-Tech-Strategy (BMBF Federal Ministry of Education and 
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Research, 2014), mark areas of strategic priorities and define the room for maneuvering for the 
S&T staff overseas. 
In sharp contrast to such well-structured sets of activities and priorities, the tasks of the EU 
delegations seem less clearly defined and organized: 
 
“It really depends on the European Delegation. Their mandate from Brussels isn’t al-
ways very clear, so some things are done directly with Brussels and the EU Delegation 
doesn’t even know.” [FR-5] 
 
Interview partners from the US were largely unaware of what exactly the EU delegation in the 
States did or were designed for and thus considered them to be insignificant. If they looked 
for the European level as a potential venue for collaborative activities, they preferred to con-
tact their counterparts in Brussels directly. 
The EU delegation is first and foremost associated with “promoting all the action of the EU in 
terms of science and technology” [FR-5], waving the flag of European research funding and 
collaborative formats like ERA or joint programming. Sometimes the delegations try to estab-
lish regular meetings of all European S&T counselors to foster an exchange of views, briefings 
on new developments in S&T, or alignment of national activities.  
The analysis identified a good many examples of SD-related collaborations taking place, most-
ly based on good personal relations and mutual esteem, emerging in ad-hoc manners, and fo-
cused on project- or event-related occasions, as some quotes illustrate: 
“We have very few cases, sometimes in Brazil, sometimes in Japan, […] for instance, 
when we promote [name of national program] jointly with the [EU] program, we ask 
someone from the EU-Delegation to participate. That are the shared interests we have. 
The [name of specific EU] programs match our own activities, there we intersect and 
work closely and effectively.” [DE-4] 
 
“I liked the approach in India. […] There is this European roadshow, organized by the 
EU, and they are first-class. The EU-Delegation has a crucial part in this. I think there 
are about 20 stops within a month, very large events. And the EU-Delegation organizes 
the complete programs and the science counselors from all the Member States’ embas-
sies are invited to participate.” [DE-6] 
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“So occasionally, when you are a very good team leader active in the science and tech-
nology field in some delegations with very reasonable counterparts in the embassies, 
you can develop cooperative framework also in important countries.” [EC-3] 
 
Across the board, the interview partners emphasized that the best collaborative opportunities 
on the operational level emerged when the regular staff of career diplomats closely collaborat-
ed with S&T counselors and supported their agenda and activities. 
“The ambassador will come and he will support and this is good because, of course, 
being the embassy, rather than being just representing a research institution, it opens a 
door, doors that I won’t be able to [open, author’s note].” [FR-3] 
 
Yet the interviews also revealed complaints about lacking willingness, or even resistance, to 
collaborate, strained communications, and conflicts of interests between EU delegations and 
Member States’ science counselors, causing a lot of frustration on both sides: 
“At the beginning, we attended all these meetings at the delegation and we had some 
frustration because it was very top-down.” [FR-3] 
 
“I remember meetings with the scientific counselor at the EU delegation in [country]. 
It was always having in front of him scientific counselors from all the embassies, say-
ing ‘I’m not okay with this or that.’ It was very frustrating, for everybody and for the 
scientific counselor.” [FR-4] 
 
The latter statement lucidly illustrates some of the challenges of the complex, multi-layered 
governance system of European policymaking. The EU delegations lack the financial and 
human resources to cover all areas of European S&T on the operational level. If they want to 
launch larger activities and to act effectively as match-makers for European S&T, they de-
pend on the support from national delegations. Yet at the same time, they have next to no 
means to persuade, or even coerce, Member States’ representatives to collaborate with them 
because these attempts lack jurisdictional legitimation. Hence it comes as no surprise that the 
EU delegations tend to focus on the external political promotion of Horizon 2020, ERA, and 
ERC as stellar examples of European science policy, thereby adhering to the well-established 
and authorized program initiatives. For this mission, they do not need the explicit approval or 
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support of the Member States. Examples like the roadshow in India demonstrate that collabo-
rations take place at the local level. But ultimately, both content and scope of their activities 
depend on the goodwill of the Member States and the Commission. 
6. Discussion 
 
SD carries and covers a wide array of different claims, strategies, and activities. European SD 
is highly heterogeneous: the umbrella term gathers numerous national initiatives, bi- and multi-
lateral projects as well as activities of the EC on an ad-hoc basis or tied to specific programs 
and funding schemes. Despite the blurry nature of the term, there are always areas of interac-
tion between Member States and the EC, some of which take the form of collaboration while 
others indicate frictions and competition. One of the key findings of the analysis is that with 
regard to these areas the use of SD follows established patterns of European MLG. 
On the level of strategic planning, any thought experiment to fundamentally change the regu-
lar, i.e. legally enshrined, way of handling policymaking related to SD meets strong resistance. 
Both the Commission and the representatives from the Member States’ administrations orient 
their strategic actions along the lines of the European policy frameworks for science policy and 
foreign affairs and show no interest to forego the principles laid down in the various treaties 
and agreements signed during post-war European history.  
Within the limits of these existing possibilities, however, an extensive field of action opens up 
for the Commission as a non-traditional actor, primarily within the scope of the established 
programmatic activities in the FP’s and various programs managed by the EEAS. At the same 
time, the lasting sovereignty of the Member States in both policy areas allows them to operate 
SD largely independently and is virtually unrestricted by European regulations. Finally, at the 
level of local operations, questions of legitimacy and jurisdictions loose importance and be-
come less relevant compared to questions of the functional efficiency of specific initiatives. 
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But how do these findings fit into the theoretical framework of MLG and what implications do 
they have for the governance of SD in Europe? 
6.1 Theoretical implications 
The empirical analysis has shown that the initial differentiation of Type I and Type II MLG 
governance helps to describe and understand the current state of affairs in European SD. Rights 
and obligations of the different actors evidently derive from core assumptions like that of add-
ed value which give meaning to the interviewees’ own actions. The interplay of the Commis-
sion and the Member States takes its course via channels that are shaped by the regulations and 
institutionalized processes in the superordinate jurisdictions of science and international rela-
tions. SD, in other words, orients itself along the lines prescribed by these Type I governance 
systems. At most, SD has the capacity to link established orders at individual points to each 
other with regard to specific problems and functional requirements, thus promoting local solu-
tions. It is not a revolutionary force that causes serious repercussions at the superordinate or-
ders but rather a fluid Type II governance patchwork without “a general blueprint” and dis-
creetly attached to existing institutional setups. Over time, this patchwork may itself become 
institutionalized and thus constitute the nucleus of a new governance system in which negotia-
tions over boundaries and clear-cut jurisdictions come to a halt.  
This interpretation also helps to explain the seeming contradiction between views that see 
“ample evidence that […] the EU is indeed – both rhetorically and in its actions – promoting 
its science diplomacy” (López de San Román and Schunz, 2018, p. 16), while others claim that 
it “remains merely a nascent element of the EU’s external engagement in science and research” 
(Prange-Gstöhl, 2018, p. 164). There is evidence for both perceptions and, by using the MLG 
perspective, it becomes clear why. As a matter of fact, there is a range of activities of the EC 
that address SD-related topics, be it by participating in the discourse (e.g., strategic documents, 
speeches) or by using its leeway at the levels of programs and operations. However, seen from 
a prescriptive point of view that claims a central role for the EC in SD policymaking, the cur-
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rent status with its multiplicity of autonomous actors and uncoordinated SD activities remains 
deficient or, put more positively, nascent.  
In terms of advancing the MLG framework and the scholarship on European integration, the 
case of SD draws attention to the subsequent question whether the findings are characteristic 
for the general relation between Type I and Type II governance systems in Europe. For in-
stance, it would be worthwhile to compare similar cases in which the policy area of foreign 
affairs is confronted with other jurisdictions associated with ‘low’ politics. The expanding list 
of specialized types of public diplomacy, such as cultural diplomacy or even more esoteric, 
sports diplomacy, might offer interesting cases for cross-sectoral comparisons (see Constan-
tinou et al., 2016). In such endeavors, the inductive approach demonstrated in this paper could 
be helpful. In addition to the distinction of levels and actors which is at the core of MLG 
scholarship, the bottom-up reconstruction of points of interaction and the heuristic division 
into strategic, programmatic and operational levels could be applied to structure other Type II 
systems as well. This approach could be linked to the concept of boundary work insofar as the 
fluidity of these systems of governance points directly to the question by which means actors 
delineate their spheres of influence and authority and, even more, whether actors loose, merge, 
or reinforce their identity in the process. With regard to SD, it is not (yet) apparent that such 
far-reaching processes of change are taking place. Instead, actors remain firmly attached to 
their respective policy areas and interpret the term against the backdrop of the established 
MLG-framework. 
At the same time, future research should ask to what extent SD serves as a label to carry the 
agenda of S&T policymakers into new policy fields (Edler, 2010). The interrelation of S&T 
policy and developmental cooperation might serve as an interesting case as it was frequently 
mentioned in policy documents and interviews alike (e.g., MAEA Ministry for Europe and 
Foreign Affairs, 2013; The Royal Society, 2010). Here, SD could be used as a new device to 
“hijack” programs and funds in the interest of actors from the S&T policy area. 
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6.2 Implications for policymaking 
Having established that SD can be seen as an area of Type II governance, the question is to 
what degree the area is indeed fluid and mutable, that is, open to changing relations and shifts 
in authority. The present system is characterized by shared responsibilities as laid down in the 
various treaties of European integration. It is unlikely that the Type I dominated modes of gov-
ernance in S&T policy and foreign affairs will change in the foreseeable future. Therefore, any 
potential for change would exclusively stem from variations within these existing institutional 
constraints. Do these limitations provide any room for maneuvering that could cause a shift in 
authority from the Member States to the Commission or the other way around? 
There is little evidence that the representatives of the state administrations desire to reclaim 
authority from the European level. The Member States are in a comfortable situation to pursue 
their own SD, provided they have the necessary financial and scientific resources. The net-
works of S&T counselors are a case in point as they are maintained particularly by the larger 
countries whose capacities exceed those of the Commission by far. A change in the current 
state of SD governance, in other words, primarily prompts the question as to whether and how 
a change of authority towards the Commission would take place. 
Overall, the most usual argument for a stronger role of the European level is attached to the 
idea of added value that guides large parts of European policymaking as described in section 
3.2. The Commission could open a window of opportunity to factually gain more influence by 
demonstrating in which areas it could deliver a SD-related service that none of the Member 
States provides on its own. An added value could be, for example, that a joint approach by 
Member States and the Commission would prevent third countries from free-riding and cherry 
picking a preferred mode of collaboration which is a situation that many interview partners 
find alarming at present. In addition, smaller Member States like Denmark could benefit from 
the EU acting as a door-opener in S&T negotiations with emerging science powers like India 
or China: 
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“And that is what I think is simply missing for the smaller Member States, which cannot 
afford these very diverse bilateral cooperation arrangements because they are not in a 
position to do so at all in terms of personnel.” [DE-3] 
 
“[…] in that sense we often feel that being a small country, that also sets limits to 
where we can engage ourselves…” [DK-3] 
 
Larger countries like Germany, France, or the UK have both the resources and the visibility to 
act on their own and do not need additional facilitators. But even interview partners from those 
countries acknowledged the advantages of joint action: “We are 80 million people and we are 
the fourth-largest economy, and yet we will not be seen on the global stage without Europe.” 
[DE-1] But even though there are valid arguments accepted by all sides for the EC to take on a 
stronger role, the instruments to seize this role must remain within the traditional institutional 
boundaries. Hence, it is likely that the Commission would then emulate well-tried tools and 
practices of European integration. 
Programs like Horizon 2020, ERA, FPI, and others, provide undisputed leeway for the Com-
mission to engage in, and generate a SD that is autonomous from that of the Member States. 
Building on the FPs, the Commission has sufficient leverage to effectively nudge and push 
European R&D towards pressing political challenges. DG RTD, for instance, has set up a 
number of funding calls explicitly geared towards the promotion of SD. These funding initia-
tives illustrate that the Commission’s ambition to follow through with its distinct political pri-
orities without touching upon existing boundaries and to advance its own idea of SD without 
calling for new agencies or structural changes in the institutional setup of European S&T and 
foreign policy. However, to ensure the legitimacy of European research, the EC must be care-
ful not to create the impression that funding decisions follow political interests. 
Aside from the program level, it is neither undisputed nor surprising that the EC also strongly 
contributes to the ongoing discourses on SD (López de San Román and Schunz, 2018). The 
participation in the discourse is relatively uncomplicated, as it requires considerably less co-
ordination processes or program budgets and comes with fewer obligations at first. For in-
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stance, Commissioner Moedas has repeatedly used the term “science diplomacy” to frame 
international S&T ambitions and activities of the EC under an umbrella of shared (scientific) 
values, international academic exchange, and peaceful collaboration (Moedas, 2017). The 
idea of a global research area that Carlos Moedas has come up with in 2016 may seem utopi-
an, but it definitely provides an attractive beacon for international cooperation in the field of 
S&T. The project is very well in line with the basic values of Europe’s “normative power” 
such as democracy, academic freedom, or responsible and sustainable innovation (López de 
San Román and Schunz, 2018). It serves as an example to the Commission's role as an agenda 
setter beyond legally legitimate formal program initiatives. Programmatic and discursive initi-
atives thus form the backbone of EC engagement in SD that could be stepped up in the future 
without having to worry about conflicts or power shifts between the European level and that 
of the Member States.  
With regard to this inter-level interaction, a commonly accepted way of avoiding conflicts 
over jurisdiction in areas of Type II governance is to establish organizational entities that bal-
ance and coordinate diverging interests (Ewert and Maggetti, 2017; Hooghe and Marks, 
2003). For instance, a process analogous to the open method of coordination (OMC) could be 
a way to reach alignment of national and EC objectives, interests, and methods in SD (see 
also Kaiser and Prange, 2004; Kerber and Eckardt, 2007). Just as the participation in the 
OMC is voluntary, Member States could choose not to engage in this coordinating process or 
to opt out. To some extent, the Strategic Forum for International S&T Cooperation already 
provides such a venue for networking and strategic planning and decision-making on a Euro-
pean level. However, those of the interview partners who brought this topic up held widely 
conflicting views on this committee, characterizing it either as an excellent forum for coordi-
nation or as a highly inefficient discussion circle.  
Apart from the dimension of inter-level interaction, it is also important to focus attention to 
the intra-level interaction within the EC. At present, it seems that the different bodies and 
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agencies of the EC collaborate more on an ad-hoc basis without an overarching strategy, 
which is not all that surprising, considering our knowledge of diverging priorities and agendas 
within the Commission (Banchoff, 2002; Rip, 2016). It seems that the different Directorates 
General are still struggling with the whole idea of SD.6 An interviewee from the Commission 
pointed out that the EEAS is a rather young institution that is still exploring venues and meth-
ods for its diplomatic activities.  
“You tend to find first of all a place for itself and then probably there would be a place 
to search for opportunities to reach out to other communities with an interest and with 
potential added value in foreign policy.” [EC-3] 
 
Perhaps it is too early to speak of joint action by the Commission (if this situation can be 
achieved at all). The established division of labor between the different DGs and the focus on 
exclusively managed programs (e.g. FPs, ERA-NETs, FPI) may also prevent the Commission 
from refocusing and taking effective and concerted action.  
An MLG-inspired approach to replace temporally and locally limited SD projects could result 
in setting up a specialized service center that acts as an in-house consultancy and could pool 
and coordinate competencies that nowadays are scattered across all the Commission’s DGs and 
agencies. Interestingly enough, the interviewees addressed individual aspects of such a center, 
i.e. promotion, coordination, mediation, or training, but no one considered bringing them to-
gether in one institution. 
7. Conclusion 
 
So far, SD is little more but an addendum to the well-established, Type I dominated policy 
areas of foreign affairs and science policy. While the term itself is rather new, it has not shaken 
up the established logics and practices of either field in the EU, but creates a potentially fluid 
intersecting space between both. Based on the empirical data and theoretical considerations, 
                                                     
6 At the European Parliament, as another of the central European institutions, the term SD even comes 
up only occasionally in resolutions and briefing documents, or with regard to specific programs. 
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potential for shifts in authority between the EC and the Member States mainly stems from 
providing complementary services and added value to national activities. Over time, seizing 
the role of a coordinating actor could cause a shift in authority and subsequent changes in the 
Type II governance of SD, leading to a soft integration of SD agendas and actions at the Euro-
pean level. Examples from the past illustrate that the EC can indeed seize an entrepreneurial 
role in agenda setting under the right conditions (Edler and James, 2015), but the empirical 
evidence from the interviews does not contain much information that points in that direction. 
More generally, the focus on SD also yields some interesting ideas for advancing the MLG 
perspective. Future research should to pay more attention to the interplay of Type I and Type II 
governance systems in order to develop a more thorough understanding whether there are re-
occurring patterns and characteristic relations between both types regardless of the specific 
policy field. 
There is one caveat to the present analysis. Since the findings are based on qualitative expert 
interviews, future research should aim to substantiate or to challenge the qualitative insights 
presented in this paper. This is particularly true for the UK-based interviews that were con-
ducted against the backdrop of ongoing Brexit-negotiations. The British interviewees could of 
course be interviewed about the then current interactions with Brussels regarding SD, yet they 
were careful to comment on the events linked to the UK leaving the EU and thus concerning 
the future relations to the Union. 
The discussion highlights potential gateways for change, but whether the Commission will 
seize these options—and the Member States will follow suit—remains to be seen in the future. 
Any attempt to introduce a new independent EC SD must accommodate for the largely diverg-
ing agendas, claims, and resources of the Member States and the Commission. The institution-
al divide between different DGs just adds another constraint to such an endeavor. It remains to 
be seen whether and on what counts the EC may successfully employ SD as a transformative 
power to expand its competencies any time soon. 
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